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ABSTRACT 
Mediation is one of the widely studied mechanisms of conflict 
management. The OSCE further pushes the concept of mediation in recent 
years, especially in the face of a number of conflicts in the region it covers. 
There is a huge literature on mediation. Most of these studies involve cases 
analysed with the help of theoretical frameworks. This research is a case study 
too. The notions put forward by the literature as the determinants of successful 
mediation are here applied to the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. More 
precisely, this study attempts to examine the OSCE mediation efforts in this 
conflict, aiming to illustrate the effect of the factors outlined by the literature on 
post-Cold War conflicts. 
OZET 
Arabuluculuk ilzerinde en fazla calisilan catisma coziim mekanizmalarindan 
biridir. Avrupa Giivenlik ve lsbirligi Orgiltii de yakin yillarda bolgesinde cikan 
catismalar nedeniyle arabuluculugu one cikarmaktadir. Cok genis bir literature 
sahip olan arabuluculuk konusunda yapilan calismalarin cogu kuramsal 
cerceveler icinde tek bir catismanin iizerine egilmektedir. Bu arastirma da buna 
bir ornektir. Literatiirde one siiriilen basarili arabuluculuk sartlarinin Daglik-
Karabag sorununda ne derece saglandigini bulmaya calismaktadir. Bu calisma 
ozellikle Avrupa Giivenlik ve Isbirligi Orgiitii'niin Daglik-Karabag 
catismasindaki arabuluculugunu irdelemekte ve soguk savas sonrasi 
catismalarda arabuluculuk literatiiriiniin one siirdiigii faktorlerin etkisini 
arastirmaktad ir. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
The post-Cold War era is marked by many intense conflicts and none has 
been resolved by peaceful means. In other words, mediation attempts by the 
OSCE and the UN have not been successful yet. The CSCE -which has recently 
became the OSCE, since its institutionalization is now completed -currently 
mediates the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the enclave of the 
N agomo-Karabakh. Its analysis is therefore necessary to discover the reasons that 
make the mediation of post-Cold War conflicts difficult. 
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is an animosity which was under control 
during the Soviet rule. However, with the beginning of the Soviet 
disintegration, national aspirations came forth once again. The issues of territorial 
sovereignty and right to self-determination have become sources of this conflict. 
As a result, Armenia and Azerbaijan engaged in a war over the status of Nagomo-
Karabakh enclave. 
Before the OSCE has undertaken the mediation of this conflict, states in 
the region, Turkey, Iran, Kazakhstan and Russia also made efforts but were 
unsuccessful. The OSCE has also been unable to find a political settlement to this 
conflict which is now six years old. There has been no formula that was 
acceptable to all sides until now. However, the fights are currently stopped and 
there is a ceasefire which has been lasting for eight months. 
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The purpose of this research is to analyze the OSCE efforts of mediation 
in the conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh. It attempts to understand the factors that 
have an impact on the effectiveness of mediation in post-Cold War conflicts. 
There exists a large body of works precisely focusing on the conditions for 
successful mediation. The mediation literature points out that: (a) the nature of 
the parties, (b) the nature of the dispute and, ( c) the nature of the mediator are the 
factors which affect the mediation process and its outcome. 
As the OSCE has envisaged the role of a mediator in such conflicts, many 
questions arise: To what degree do these factors affect its success as a mediator in 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict? Does the role it performs reflect the interaction 
between the factors that are important for its effectiveness? To answer these 
questions the notions put forward in the literature of mediation will be applied to 
the case of N agorno-Karabakh in this research. 
In fact, more factors can be included in these categories like the 
motivations of the mediator and different explanations for the role of the 
mediator. However, their inclusion would require the building of more 
complicated hypotheses that is beyond the scope of this study. Thus one 
limitation of this study is that it does not thoroughly cover the theories of 
mediation in other fields but instead it focuses on mediation studies in 
international relations that are most common. Its principal shortcoming is that it 
only takes the Nagorno-Karabakh issue to illustrate how mediation studies can 
help us to discover important aspects of this conflict to recommend ways to 
resolve it. It should be preferable to apply these theories to other cases in order to 
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generalize the results. Nevertheless, the insight gained by this application is 
already rich enough to affirm that it contributes to our understanding of post-Cold 
War conflicts and their future resolution. 
The contribution of this study is at both theoretical and empirical levels. 
The results suggest that the factors proposed by the literature are helpful in the 
analysis of post-Cold war conflicts. At the empirical level, they help to discover 
effective mechanisms for the resolution of these conflicts. The general conclusion 
is that the likelihood of a successful OSCE mediation is low in the short term. 
The pessimistic result is due to the nature of the parties and the dispute. 
Based on this background the second chapter presents the theoretical bases 
of the study pointing out the principal sources of mediation analysis. The third 
chapter describes the OSCE mechanism for the prevention of conflicts and the 
peaceful settlement of the disputes. The fourth chapter summarizes the history of 
the conflict and the mediation efforts by the OSCE. The fifth chapter constructs 
the analysis on the basis of these data and concepts. The last chapter contains the 
conclusions. 
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CHAPTER II: MEDIATION IN THEORY 
Mediation is one of the widely studied conflict management mechanisms. 
There exist different however limited definitions of mediation. In the present 
study mediation is defined as "a process of conflict management where disputants 
seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from an individual, group, state 
or organization to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without 
resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law." 1 
2.1 Factors Affectini: Mediation 
2.1.1 The Nature of The Parties: 
Types of conflicting parties. Looking at the types of parties in conflict 
and their relationship and the success or failure of a mediation effort, Frei reports 
that conflicts between insurgent groups are the most difficult ones to solve.2 
Pure interstate conflicts seem to be relatively amenable to mediation. These 
results suggest that the more clearly defined the conflicting parties are, the clearer 
the addresses of a mediative action will be. Similarly, Bercovitch posits that 
"conflict management by third parties can occur only between adversaries with 
well-defined identities. Mediation has a better chance of success when the 
adversaries are recognized as the legitimate spokesmen for their parties. "3 
Power disparity. Another condition influencing the effectiveness of 
international mediation is the degree of power disparity between adversaries. Ott 
suggests that the smaller the power difference between the adversaries, the greater 
the effectiveness of international mediation.4 Butterworth's study suggests that 
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mediation is effective in disputes involving adversaries with equal power.s 
Similarly, Bercovitch argues that "in cases of clear power disparity, the stronger 
adversary would not be prepared to countenance any concessions or compromise 
proposals. "6 On the contrary, Frei argues that in those cases where the 
capabilities of the parties concerned match each other, the parties will not accept 
mediation because either party may still hope for better times.7 Similarly, 
Deutsch claims that the resolution of conflicts will be easier, if there is a mutual 
recognition of differential power. 8 Thus, we have two contradictory hypotheses 
about how the power disparity affects the effectiveness of a mediation effort. 
Previous relationship. Two factors are involved here: the history of 
cooperation and conflict between the parties and their interdependence. Deutsch 
posits that the previous relationship between the parties is one of the fundamental 
determinants of conflict outcomes. 9 He suggests that parties with a history of 
friendship or cooperation will also approach a present conflict more 
cooperatively. In a recent study, Bercovitch et al. also found that "it is easier to 
mediate between friends." 10 
According to many theorists, close interdependence, and in particular, 
economic interdependence between the parties concerned will increase the 
chances of peaceful conflict resolution, and hence the probability of a successful 
mediation outcome. Frei's findings, though he looks at a small number of cases in 
this context, confirm this hypothesis. I I 
5 
Personality conflict. In addition to the points above on the relationship 
between parties, "absence of an intense personality conflict among the leaders of 
the conflicting groups has also been viewed as a factor contributing to the success 
of a mediation effort" 12, but it is further argued that its negative effect can be 
decreased by a skillful mediator. 
Regime type. This can also be a determinant of the effectiveness of 
mediation. A traditional hypothesis in the study of international relations posits 
that those states that are more democratic or pluralistic are less prone to initiate 
violent interactions than their non democratic counter-parts. However, a study by 
Maoz and Abdolali suggests that although democracies rarely go to war with one 
another they are no less prone to conflict than other political regimes. 13 Indeed, 
"democratic states engage in wars as often as other types of states [but], 
democracies virtually never fight against one another" 14 because "shared norms 
fostered by a democratic political culture promote peaceful conflict resolution." ts 
Raymond asserts that in conflicts between democratic states, third-party 
mechanisms with judicial competence will be used. On the contrary, conflicts 
between non democratic dyads are not referred to such mechanisms because non 
democratic dyads will prefer to use the mediator as a go-between whose 
suggestions may be rejected, should they collide with perceived national interest. 
Finally, the inner unity of the conflicting parties also affects mediation 
efforts. Assefa asserts that "even though the inner unity of the conflicting parties 
does not necessarily bring about the success of a mediation effort, its lack hinders 
it." 16 According to Frei, the existence and the change of government on one side 
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may influence mediation effectiveness.11 
2.1.2. The Nature of The Dispute: 
Generally, theoreticians and practitioners argue that the nature of the 
dispute largely determines the success or failure of the mediation. The indicators 
of the nature of the dispute are argued to be the issues, the intensity of the 
conflict, and the time factor. 
Issues. The importance adversaries attach to the issues in dispute will 
affect the chances of mediation. When vital interests are affected (for example 
issues of sovereignty or territorial control), intermediaries will be unlikely to have 
much impact on the dispute. Ott sees the absence of vital national security 
interests, particularly questions of territorial control as a necessary precondition 
for successful mediation.18 Kressel and Pruitt also argue that "matters of 
principle", (territory, ideology, security, independence, resources) will defy 
mediation. 19 According to Lall when territory is at stake, the party in possession 
tends to resist third-party intervention.20 In addition to these, "honoring 
obligations engaged by the other side" may influence mediation effectiveness.21 
Intensity. Here again there are two contradictory views. The first one 
suggests that when the intensity of the dispute is higher, the parties will be more 
eager to accept mediation to cut losses and it will be successful. The second one 
asserts that when the number of losses increases and the conflict gets more 
intense, the parties' positions will become polarized and will not accept mediation 
attempts to win at all costs. Accordingly, in low intensity disputes, mediation is 
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more likely to be accepted and successful. Protracted and intense international 
disputes are not amenable to mediation.22 A recent study conducted by 
Bercovitch and Langley in 1993 confirms that intensely hostile disputes with 
many issues at stake and high fatalities are not particularly amenable to 
mediation. 23 
Time factor. The time factor may affect the mediation efforts as regards 
the duration of the conflict and the ripeness of the moment at which the third 
party intervenes. Scholars agree that to be effective mediation must take place at 
. the most propitious moment but they disagree on the realization of this moment 
and its determinants. Edmead claims that mediation is more likely to succeed if it 
is attempted at an early stage, well before the adversaries cross a threshold of 
violence and begin to inflict heavy losses on each other.24 Similarly, Talloires 
assumes that a last minute mediation intensifies the conflict and is useless.25 In 
contrast, Northedge and Donelan suggest that mediation can be effective only 
when a dispute has gone through a few phases and must certainly not be initiated 
before each side has shown a willingness to moderate its intransigence and revise 
its expectation.26 Douglas proposes that the mediator should not intervene at a 
too early stage, and under no circumstances should he intervene before the parties 
have made clear to each other their extreme bargaining positions and hence 
realize that a certain compromise will be inevitable.27 
Bercovitch et al. testing both hypotheses conclude "the longer the dispute 
goes on the less amenable it is to mediation, but . . . a certain amount of time is 
necessary before mediation is successful." 28 A certain amount of time must pass, 
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allowing a test of strength, but not beyond the point where parties' positions 
become too polarized. In other words, a duration of the conflict is necessary for 
an effective mediation. Bercovitch et al. also add that if a mediation attempt 
follows a number of ones that failed, the success of the new attempt will also be 
affected negatively after the first and the second attempts. 29 
The concept of ripeness is also emphasized as a determinant of effective 
mediation. 3o Kriesberg claims that mediation should take place at the right time, 
that is when the situation is ripe. Ripe in this context means the time is right for 
de-escalation. However, there is no unique right time for de-escalating efforts. 
Timing refers to recognizing whether the adversaries are ready to move away 
from escalation or down from stalemate. Thus, a ripe moment depends upon the 
duration of the conflict: if there is no time passed, there is no ripe moment either. 
Kriesberg emphasizes three conditions as the determinants of conflict de-
escalation: domestic pressures, the relations between the adversaries, and the 
international context. Accordingly, what type of settlement is acceptable to which 
parties must be determined under the given set of conditions, as time is ripe for 
one kind of settlement or another.31 Similarly, Haass argues that ripeness plays a 
central role in the negotiation of regional disputes, and that for each conflict 
ripeness may be different. The reason for this is inherent in the nature of the 
conflict or the parties because they are not ready for an agreement. Thus in such 
situations mediation efforts will fail to bring about a negotiated agreement. He 
suggests five essentials of ripeness: 
1 - there must be a shared perception of the desirability of an agreement, 
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2 - political leaders must either be sufficiently strong to permit 
compromise or sufficiently weak so that compromise cannot be avoided, 
3 - there must be a formula that involves sufficient compromise on both 
sides so that leaders can make a case to their colleagues/or publics that the 
national interest was protected, 
4 - there must be a mutually acceptable process, 
5 - negotiations prosper most when no major diversions occur. 32 
Another time-oriented view goes beyond the notion of incompatibilities of 
will and solutions. Zartman posits that at any moment policies are chosen from 
among many desirable goals on the basis of comparative costs and benefits. Since 
these can be altered by both the external context and the parties' interactions, 
some moments are better than others for managing and resolving conflict. This 
view posits the components of a ripe moment. The basic component of a ripe 
moment is a deadlock that keeps both parties from achieving their goals. But a 
deadlock is not enough, it must be a particular kind of stalemate that hurts both 
parties enough to make them feel uncomfortable and unable to break out by an 
escalation with acceptable costs. Mutually hurting stalemate is also not enough. 
It has to be riveted to parties' perception. This can be a deadline or a warning that 
threatens to impose additional and unacceptable costs of higher magnitude. There 
must also be a formula for solution and the indication that the parties, in principle 
require such a solution and if it is attractive enough they will respond positively to 
other's moves. 33 
2.1.3. The Nature of The Mediator 
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The nature of the mediator consists of mediator's identity, characteristics, 
and the role it performs for the resolution of the conflict. The role of the mediator 
can also be referred as the " mediator's strategy". This is the final factor after the 
nature of the parties and of the dispute influencing the effectiveness of any 
mediation effort. 
Identity. In the mediation literature, the classification of the mediator's 
identity usually refers to the type of actor attempting to mediate. These can be: 
a) individuals 
b) states 
c) institutions and organizations (regional organizations, international 
rganizations, transnational organizations). 
Characteristics. In general, the characteristics of a successful mediator 
are: 1- neutrality, which refers to the condition that the mediator has no direct 
interest in conflict issues between the disputants, 
2 - impartiality, which refers to the condition that the mediator has no 
?references favoring a party over the other or biases against one or the other 
lisputant, 
3- acceptability to all protagonists, 
4- knowledge and skill to deal with the issues, 
5-possession of required physical resources, e.g. meeting-site, 
ransportation and communication facilities, persons for verification and 
:ispection services, 
6- international support for the mediator, 
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7- leverage, the possibility for the mediator to put pressure on one or both 
parties to accept proposed settlement Mediators' resources constitute the basis 
required for exercising leverage.34 In addition to reward resources and coercive 
resources, the acceptability and the expertise of the mediator affect the amount of 
leverage it can exercise. 35 
Whether the mediator is an individual, state or an organization, according 
to Princen it can be a "neutral" or a "principal" mediator depending on its 
interests. Princen assumes that mediators have their own interests, that 
fundamental differences exist among mediators, and that a mediator's bargaining 
relationship with the disputants is critical for understanding its impact on a 
dispute. The mediator can have direct interests on the disputed issue or it may 
have indirect interests, like strategic interests in the region. 
If a party has no direct or indirect interests, then the party may be called a 
"neutral mediator". The neutral mediators' lacking direct or indirect interests in 
the issues between principal disputants does not mean that they are without 
interests at all. They have interests in the dispute. They may want to see an 
agreement reached, peace realized or may want to improve their images as 
peacemakers. "Neutral mediators have interests, but they lie outside the issues in 
dispute, and therefore are not subject to bargaining with disputants." When the 
mediator possesses interests on the issues in the dispute it is a "principal 
mediator." Princen puts all international organizations in the former category 
and argues that for complex disputes that evolve over time a combination of 
principal and neutral mediators carefully sequenced will be most effective. 36 
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Mitchell dwelling on impartiality, neutrality and leverage suggests that, 
third parties must possess qualities of impartiality and neutrality if they are the 
low coercive potential type of intermediary so that their efforts are either 
acceptable or successful. "Without such qualities, it is often argued, only the 
most powerful third parties ['principal mediators' in Princen's terms] will be able 
to impose their intermediary role and possibly a final settlement. With less 
powerful third parties, both individuals and their sponsoring organizations must 
appear neutral and act impartially to be acceptable. "37 According to Zartman 
and Touval leverage is more important than impartiality since the task of 
mediation is to persuade the parties. 38 
Role. The role of the mediator has to be analyzed within a dynamic view 
as the role of the mediator can change during the mediation process. 39 Such a 
view advocates three principal roles and strategies "in which mediators operate to 
affect the positions of the parties in conflict, inducing them to agree to 
concessions necessary for the reduction or the resolution of the conflict and also 
contributing to the advancement of mediators' self-interested goals." 40 
In most conflicts there is no communication between the adversaries. 
They do not contact directly and need a channel of communication to give 
concessions without appearing weak. Mediators can act as a "communicator" in 
such cases. The available communication facilitation strategies to the mediators 
involve, identifying issues and interests, arranging for interactions between the 
parties, encouraging meaningful communication. 
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Mediators can also have a more active role. In addition to the lack of 
communication between the parties, they may also be short of bringing any 
solutions that meet the needs of both parties. Then the mediator can perform the 
role of a "formulator". For the termination of the conflict, the issues must· be 
redefined and a formula has to be found to manage and resolve the conflict. 
Parties often require the help of innovative thinking in finding out parties' real 
interests and their component ingredients. Formulation strategies involve 
choosing meeting sites, establishing protocol, suggesting procedures, controlling 
timing. Mediators performing these roles do not attempt to change the nature of 
the problem or the circumstances of the conflict. The mediators have no 
preference among solutions, do not exercise power and have no weight. 
When the roles of communicator and formulator are not enough the 
mediator can perform a more active role as a "manipulator". "This is a structural 
role, since it directly involves power and relations, and as such is a role of power 
politics... the triangular structure provides the mediator with bargaining power 
vis-a-vis the parties because of the constant possibility that it will join in a 
coalition with one against the other. "41 "The most active strategy, that of 
manipulation involves the mediator directly in changing the parties' decision-
making process, through rewards, exerting pressure, ... offering substantive 
proposals. "42 
The strategies and behavior of international mediators change due to 
"differences in the nature and context of a dispute and the characteristics of the 
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parties involved. Mediation strategy must, if it is to be effective, match and 
reflect these factors, "43 including the determining of the necessary amount of 
leverage. 
In summary, there are differences in explanation of the categories of 
effective mediation. There is however a consensus in the literature about the 
basic determinants of the effectiveness of mediation. These are the nature of the 
parties, the nature of the dispute, and the nature of the mediator. The next 
chapter will outline the OSCE framework in dealing with conflicts and the 
background of the N agorno-Karabakh conflict. 
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CHAPTER III: THE OSCE MECHANISM 
CSCE, was a forum for dialogue, negotiation and cooperation. It was 
formally launched by the signing of the Helsinki Final Act on 1 August 1975 by 
thirty-five states. The end of the cold war urged CSCE to adopt changes as 
conflicts were the primary consequences of the disintegration of Yugoslavia and 
the Soviet Union. Especially the disintegration of these two countries has led to 
the emergence of new armed conflicts and the use of force for territorial 
expansion in Europe. 
Accommodation for change started with the Paris Summit of 1990 which 
decided to develop mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of conflicts. 
Paris Charter accepted at the end of the summit created the five institutions of the 
CSCE: 
1. Council 
2. Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) 
3. CSCE Secretariat 
4. Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) 
5. Office of Free Elections (OPE) 
With the Charter the CSCE became institutionalized and by 1994 the 
number of its members increased to fifty-three. During the last Budapest summit 
the CSCE changed its name into OSCE (Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe), a development which indicates that the 
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institutionalization process is now completed. 1 OSCE's emerging conflict 
prevention and settlement role is explained by two of OSCE's three "baskets" of 
issues: the human dimension and security. 
3.1. The Human Dimension: 
OSCE has decided that human rights and minority rights are a legitimate 
subject of concern to all OSCE members, and are not only a matter of national 
sovereignty. This principle was agreed at the Moscow Conference on the Human 
Dimension in October 1991. 
According to OSCE the rights of minorities include "respect for the 'rights 
of persons belonging to national minorities', their full equality with other citizens, 
their right to linguistic ethnic, cultural, religious identity and to participate in 
national affairs. "2 On the basis of these principles OSCE can be involved in 
internal and interstate conflicts including ethnic and minority disputes. The 
Human Dimension Experts/Rapporteurs Mechanism (Moscow Mechanism) of the 
Moscow Document is part of the general Human Dimension. However, the 
Moscow Mechanism provides OSCE member states a right to send fact finding 
missions to observe human rights abuses in other states. These missions are 
divided according to their tasks. 
The expert mission. It has limited tasks because it is less intrusive in the 
internal affairs of the state, in comparison to the rapporteur mission. It aims to 
facilitate particular resolution of a particular question or problem relating to the 
human dimension of the . It may gather the information necessary for carrying 
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out its task and use its good offices and mediation services to promote dialogue 
and cooperation among interested parties. 
The rapporteur mission. It establishes the facts, reports on them and may 
give advice on possible solutions to the question raised. Its report contains 
observation of facts, proposals or advice. 3 
3.2 The Conflict Prevention Centre and the Dispute Settlement Mechanism: 
The task of the Conflict Prevention Centre is to assist the OSCE Council 
of Ministers in reducing the risk of conflict. "Its original mandate was to 
implement agreements on Confidence and Security Building Measures. It was to 
house a data bank for the exchange of military information and to be a centre for 
'hot lines' between member states. "4 
The Valetta meeting on peaceful settlement of disputes held in Malta in 
February 1991 created a "OSCE procedure for Peaceful Settlement of Disputes" 
which is also known as the "V aletta Mechanism". The mechanism consists of a 
panel of conciliators called "dispute counselors" whom member states can call 
upon. The mechanism is aimed at assisting 'the parties in identifying suitable 
procedures for the settlement of the dispute' which may relate to the inception or 
resumption of a process of negotiation among the parties or to the adoption of any 
other dispute settlement procedure or a combination thereof'. Any party (states) 
to a dispute may request the mechanism to provide general or specific comment 
or advice on the substance of the dispute.5 The comments do not have any 
binding force but are accepted to be considered in good faith. The responsibility 
18 
for operating the Mechanism is placed with the Conflict Prevention Centre and 
enlarged the scope of its duties. However the V aletta Mechanism has several 
exclusions. 
First, no internal disputes are subject to the mechanism. Secondly, even of 
the international disputes, those concerning 'territorial integrity, national 
defence, title to land territory or competing claims with regard to the 
jurisdiction over other areas are excluded, as are disputes which have 
already been dealt with or are being addressed under other procedures. 
These provisions exclude the vital current conflicts in Europe. 6 
3.3. The Emereency Mechanism: 
The OSCE meeting in Berlin m July 1991 adopted an "Emergency 
Mechanism" to address urgent conflict situations. According to also called 
"Berlin Mechanism" any OSCE member state may notify the OSCE of a dispute 
and call for the mechanism to be invoked. Then inquiries are made within forty-
eight hours. 
If thirteen or more states agree, the OSCE calls a meeting of senior 
officials of all states to discuss the crisis. The introduction of this 
provision mitigates the principle of consensus which would previously 
have allowed any state to block a meeting of the Committee of Senior 
Officials. However, consensus is still required for actions by the 
Committee. 7 
The OSCE states have addressed the conflicts in former Yugoslavia and Nagorno-
Karabakh under this mechanism. 
The fourth OSCE follow up meeting in Helsinki held in March-July 1992, 
discussed further means of strengthening the OSCE's conflict prevention and 
crisis management abilities. On 10 July the OSCE adopted a seventy-six page 
document outlining the decisions reached at the Helsinki Conference. The OSCE 
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Helsinki Document 1992, the challenges of change declared that the "OSCE is a 
regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter 8 of the Charter of the United 
Nations. "8 The document outlines a new framework for the prevention of the 
disputes. 
3.4. The Hii:h Commissioner on National Minorities: 
The High Commissioner on National Minorities will provide early 
warning, and as appropriate early action at the earliest possible stage in regard to 
tensions involving national minority issues which have not yet developed beyond 
an early warning stage but in the judgment of the High commissioner, have the 
potential to develop into a conflict within the OSCE area, affecting peace, 
stability or relations between participating states.9 
3.5. The Committee of Senior Officials: 
The OSCE decided to enhance its capability to 'identify the root causes of 
tension' and to 'provide for more flexible and active dialogue and better early 
warning and dispute settlement' by giving new responsibilities to the Committee 
of Senior Officials. The CSO is to obtain early warning through a dispute being 
brought to its attention by: any state directly involved in a dispute, a group of 
eleven states not directly involved, the High Commissioner on National 
Minorities, the Conflict Prevention Centre, the activation of the Human 
Dimension Mechanism, the activation of the V aletta Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism. The Conference empowered the CSO to decide what to do to 
manage situations at an early stage. The Committee could set up rapporteur and 
expert missions, promote good offices, mediation and conciliation and if 
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appropriate send peacekeeping forces. 
3.6. Peacekeepine: 
The decision to take on a peacekeeping role is a new step for the OSCE. 
It was decided that the OSCE could undertake peacekeeping operations, managed 
by the CSO, with the assistance of the CPC, the troika of Chairs in Office and an 
ad hoc group of member states. The OSCE could ask troops and resources from 
Western European Union, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and NATO. 
The dispatching of peacekeeping forces is possible only if a consensus existed 
among member states, if the states in the conflict approved in writing, and if a 
durable and effective ceasefire was in place. Finally, the member states have 
donated the Chairman in Office of the OSCE Council a role in conflict 
prevention supported by past and following chairs and by an ad hoc group of 
member states. 
Above are the basic principles of the OSCE regarding conflict prevention 
and management. Since the OSCE has pushed the concept of mediation within its 
framework, it launched an eleven nation conference in 1992 to mediate the armed 
conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the status of Nagomo-Karabak:h. 
The next chapter presents the historical background of the conflict in part one and 
outlines the chronology of the OSCE attempts in part two. 
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CHAPTER IV: THE CONFLICT and THE MEDIATION PROCESS 
4.1. History of the Conflict Over Naeorno-Karabakh 
The claims over the mountainous region of Nagomo-Karabakh have been 
a matter of controversy for Armenians and Azerbaijanis for hundreds of years. 
"When Soviet power was established in Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1920, the 
status of the region was strongly disputed." 1 Although the enclave was 
demographically dominated by Armenians with a sizable Azerbaijani minority, it 
was granted the status of an autonomous oblast within the Azerbaijani Soviet 
Socialist Republic in 1923. "In so doing [Stalin] ensured that between the 
Armenians, who have never ceased demanding the return of the [Nagorno-
Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] (NKAO) and the [Azerbaijanis] who guard their 
constitutional claims, there would be a structural and self-perpetuating source of 
discord. "2 Even though the tension was not explicit under Soviet rule, when the 
ethnic and nationalist impulses were suppressed, Armenians demanded the return 
of Nagomo-Karabakh to Armenia several times. Moscow rejected these 
demands and the oblast remained within Azerbaijan. However with the policies 
of perestroika the debate over N agorno- Karabakh reemerged. 
The "latest conflict over the Nagomo-Karabakh began in the summer of 
1987, with a petition drive by Armenians who wished to annex the NKAO to 
Armenia. "3 It was the Armenian argument that N agomo-Karabakh was 
transferred to Azerbaijan by Stalin during sovietization and that the government 
in Baku conducted repressive policies against Armenian culture as well as 
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prevented the socioeconomic development of the region. In February 1988 
demonstrations took place in both Erevan and Nagomo-Karabakh and "the oblast 
soviet applied to the Supreme Soviets of Armenia, Soviet Union and Azerbaijan 
for the oblast's transfer to Armenia. "4 Gorbachev met with Armenian leaders of 
the Karabakh Committee and "within a month the USSR Soviet of Ministers 
passed a resolution calling for faster socioeconomic development of the NKAO as 
part of Azerbaijan. "5 Yet these attempts did not deter the drive for annexation. 
In the following months demonstrations continued; there was increasing 
unrest in NKAO and in the Aghdam region of Azerbaijan. During this time many 
Armenians living in Azerbaijan fled to Armenia and also Azerbaijanis living in 
Armenia fled to Azerbaijan. In July 1988 the NKAO Soviet in which Armenians 
were predominant, unilaterally declared its secession from the Azerbaijan SSR. 
The Azerbaijanis declared the act illegal. Then the USSR Supreme Soviet took 
up the issue, and the result was a decision to establish a "special commission" 
from Moscow to observe conditions and ostensibly strengthen and develop the 
autonomy of the NKAO. In November the Presidium of the USSR Supreme 
Soviet issued its decision to retain the NKAO in Azerbaijan. This was followed 
by demonstrations and clashes that led to state of emergency yet the tension was 
not reduced. As a result at the beginning of 1989 a "special form of 
administration" in the NKAO was established by the USSR Supreme Soviet. 
Hence the enclave would be directly ruled from Moscow. This decision also 
failed to lessen tensions, during this time daily clashes were being reported 
despite the presence of Soviet army and MVD troops. 
23 
In November -1989, "Gorbachev issued a decree on the 'normalization' of 
administration in the NKAO, including the restoration of the old Armenian-
dominated soviet and the continued presence of MVD forces under Moscow's 
orders. Azerbaijan objected the two provisions. Within a few days, Armenia 
declared unilateral annexation of the NKAO. "6 From that moment the conflict 
intensified. In January 1990 soviet troops entered Balm when communal conflicts 
broke out between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. 
In mid-1991 the state of emergency was lifted but fighting continued in 
Karabakh and along the Armenian border. In September 1991, following 
Azerbaijan's declaration of independence, the parliament of Nagorno-Karabakh 
proclaimed the region independent of Azerbaijan. This complicated relations 
between Nagorno-Karabakh and the Armenian government. Armenia abjured all 
territorial claims on Karabakh but continued to insist that the oblast's Armenian 
population had the right to autonomy.7 
As the conflict further intensified with the breakup of the Soviet Union 
and the withdrawal of CIS troops, the two sides could test their respective military 
strength. Heavily armed units on both sides battered the towns and villages in and 
around the Karabakh. "At the outset, the Armenian forces were clearly ascendant 
and won a number of critical military victories including the opening of a corridor 
at Lachin through Azeri territory to the disputed enclave .... " In the summer of 
1992 the balance shifted .... Azerbaijanis recaptured part of territory that had been 
lost."8 In 1993 and until mid 1994 Armenians and Azerbaijanis had respective 
gains on each other. The two sides fought a war of attrition in both Karabakh and 
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Azerbaijani mainland until the last ceasefire that is still in effect. 
Against this background, the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh has been 
subject to many peace initiatives that failed. To date, the most intensive 
negotiations aimed at resolving this conflict have been held by the OSCE. 
4.2. OSCE Efforts at Resolvin2 the Na2orno-Karabakh Crisis: A 
Chronolo2y 
When the conflict between the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis in the 
enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh intensified at the end of 1991, international 
mediation efforts began. Numerous diplomatic initiatives aimed at bringing about 
a negotiated settlement yielded minimal results. In September 1991 both Russia 
and Kazakhstan attempted but failed to mediate a ceasefire. In the first months of 
1992 Turkey and Iran also sought to mediate a ceasefire. The United States, the 
United Nations and Russia supported these mediation efforts but no ceasefire 
agreement could take effect. Finally, a ceasefire reached through Russian 
mediation in late spring of 1994 is still in force. 
Armenia and Azerbaijan became members to the OSCE during the OSCE 
Council meeting in Prague on 30-31 January. As all the new participants these 
two republics were admitted on the condition that they accepted a rapporteur 
mission. It would report participating states on the progress and toward full 
implementation of OSCE commitments and providing assistance toward that 
objective. The missions to Armenia and Azerbaijan also visited the troubled area 
of N agorno- Karabakh and had a broader mandate to off er suggestions for a 
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political solution to the crisis.9 On February 15, a ten member observer team 
from the OSCE visited Armenia, Azerbaijan as well as Nagomo-Karabakh. "The 
OSCE urged an immediate ceasefire, the creation of a commission on refugees 
and an embargo on arms sales to both sides of the conflict." 10 
Nagomo-Karabakh dispute was on the OSCE agenda at the meeting of 
Committee of Senior Officials in Prague on 28 February, 1992. During the 
meeting the OSCE accepted a ceasefire plan and its attempt for the resolution of 
the Nagomo-Karabakh conflict began. The plan intended to provide for a 
ceasefire, humanitarian aid and also encouraged regional and international 
mediation efforts. OSCE welcomed such efforts by Russia and Kazakhstan and 
asked them to continue their efforts. This plan also recognized that "Nagomo-
Karabakh belonged to Azerbaijan but proposed it should be allowed 'self-
determination.' "l l 
The OSCE Committee of Senior Officials meeting on 13-14 March 1992 
at Helsinki discussed further details of the resolution of the Nagomo-Karabakh 
crisis. The participants agreed to set up a peace conference under the auspices of 
the OSCE to provide an ongoing forum for negotiations towards a peaceful 
settlement of the dispute. The OSCE Council meeting of March 26 decided to 
have the conference at Minsk, comprising ten states: Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Sweden, Turkey, Czechoslovakia and the United 
States with the participation of a delegation from Nagomo-Karabakh. The 
chairman of the conference, after consultations with the participant states, would 
invite the elected and other representatives of Nagomo-Karabakh. 
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OSCE envisaged a two stage plan. The first one aimed a meeting of 
representatives of Armenia, Azerbaijan and a representative of Nagomo-Karabakh 
attending as a related party for a ceasefire. The second stage would provide for 
the holding of a ten nation peace conference in Minsk. The OSCE president 
Czechoslovak. foreign minister Jiri Dienstbier arrived in Baku on March 31 at the 
head of a OSCE delegation in order to clarify the situation. However, the first 
stage of the OSCE plan did not work as arranged since Azerbaijan refused to 
accept Nagomo-Karabakh Armenians as a negotiating partner. As a result, five 
rounds of preparatory talks held in Rome between June and September 1992 were 
unproductive due to discussions over the official status of representatives of 
N agomo-Karabakh Armenians. 
Meanwhile the fighting intensified. Although both Russia and Kazakhstan 
worked for a ceasefire, those that took effect were short-lived. Since the talks in 
Rome preparatory to the conference in Minsk collapsed there was no OSCE 
meeting regarding the Nagomo-Karabakh dispute until February 1993. OSCE 
sponsored talks were resumed in Rome on 26 February and the chairman Mario 
Rafaelli told that there were three draft documents outlining conditions for a 
ceasefire.12 On March 2, the deputy chairman of the OSCE sponsored peace talks 
in Rome stated that the two sides reached a tentative agreement during the final 
round of talks on a document which called all sides in the conflict to refrain from 
further hostilities. The plan would be ratified by the OSCE Council of Senior 
Officials that would meet in Prague in April, then international observers would 
enforce a ceasefire and supervise the return of refugees. 
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Following this, 'foreign troops' would withdraw and the armed bandits 
would be disarmed. Negotiations continued during the six days of informal 
discussions in Geneva. Russia, Turkey the United States attented this meeting 
alongside Armenia and Azerbaijan. The meeting ended on 26 March with an 
agreement to continue negotiations in April. However the fighting intensified and 
Armenian forces advanced taldng Kelbecher region of Azerbaijan. As a result, 
Azerbaijan stated that the OSCE sponsored talks which would resume on April 2 
in Geneva could not continue until Armenian forces had withdrawn from 
Kelbecher. United Nations also reacted to Armenian occupation of Kelbecher. 
"On 6 April the United Nations Security Council expressed 'serious concern' at 
the invasion of Kelbecher by 'local Armenian forces' and called for an immediate 
ceasefire." 13 
A group of OSCE officials visited the conflict area to inspect Karabakh 
and Kelbecher after a ceasefire took effect on 19 April. During this time 
Azerbaijani president Abulfez Elchibey and Armenian president Levon Ter 
Petrosyan met in Ankara at Turkish president Turgut Chal's funeral. Elchibey 
agreed to resume negotiations on Karabakh within the OSCE framework without 
the precondition of Armenian withdrawal from Kelbecher. But on 28 April the 
OSCE meeting in Vienna drew up a statement condemning the seizure of 
Azerbaijan's Kelbecher region by occupying forces and calling for their 
withdrawal as a precondition for resuming peace negotiations." 14 Accordingly, 
Nagorno-Karabakh forces had begun a partial withdrawal from Kelbecher region. 
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On 29-30 April, Turkey, Russia and the United States drew up a new 
peace plan for Nagorno-Karabakh with an intention to resume the stalled OSCE 
sponsored negotiations. The plan called for an immediate ceasefire followed the 
withdrawal between 9-14 May of Armenian forces from Kelbecher and a two 
month moratorium of all military activity beginning on 12 May. Peace talks 
would be held in Geneva on 17-22 May to be followed by a resumption of the 
OSCE sponsored negotiations in Rome on 24-25 May. Details of this plan were 
submitted to authorities.in Baku, Erevan and Stepanakert on 3 May. 
On May 6, Azerbaijan stated that it accepted the terms of the tripartite 
plan while Erevan's reaction to the plan was also positive. Nevertheless, Erevan 
added that it could not approve the plan unconditionally since the self-declared 
Nagorno- Karabakh Republic asked for clarifications on several points. 
Consequently, an amended version of this plan was submitted to Armenian 
government and the Nagorno-Karabakh representatives in Erevan on 18 May. 
The new version of the plan proposed a withdrawal of Armenian forces 
from Kelbecher under international supervision between 29 May and 3 June and a 
two month ceasefire beginning 1 June. Separate rounds of peace talks in Geneva 
and Rome would follow in June. On May 26 Armenia and Azerbaijan formally 
approved the tripartite peace plan sponsored by the OSCE. However the Defence 
Committee that functions as the government of the self-declared Nagorno-
Karabakh Republic rejected the plan because it did not provide guarantee for the 
safety of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh or stipulate an end to the 
Azerbaijani economic blockade. 
29 
The OSCE Minsk Group met in Rome in order to drew up a new peace 
plan which was based on the United Nations Security Council Resolution. The 
plan was submitted to the leaders of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh 
on 7 June. The new plan provided for the withdrawal of Armenian forces from 
Kelbecher, a ceasefire, lifting of blockades and a return to normal communication 
and international monitoring of the truce. Armenia and Azerbaijan approved the 
plan. The Supreme Soviet of Presidium of the self-declared Nagorno-Karabakh 
Republic voted to accept the plan. However at the time the domestic situation in 
Azerbaijan complicated the development. 
On June 13 a rebellion was launched by Suret Huseinov, former 
commander of the Azerbaijani forces in the Karabakh front-line, who had been 
dismissed by Elchibey in February. He moved from Genja towards Baku with a 
few hundred troops and demanded Elchibey's resignation. Hence, due to the 
internal strife in Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh asked for a one month 
postponement of the plan's implementation. 
In Azerbaijan, Elchibey left Baku and Haydar Aliyev, the president of the 
Autonomous Republic of Nakhichevan became the acting president of Azerbaijan. 
The political turmoil in Azerbaijan enabled Armenian forces to take new 
offensives. As a result, Mario Rafaelli, the OSCE mediator for the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict and the chairman of the OSCE Minsk conference who was to 
visit the area on 5 July cancelled his visit since the fighting did not stop. Rafaelli 
was able to visit Baku, Erevan and Stepenakert between 10 and 14 July with a 
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OSCE delegation. However the OSCE visit failed to produce any concrete results 
regarding the implementation of the peace plan. Armenian forces continued their 
advance in Azerbaijani territory and gained Agdam, Fizuli and Cebrail. Meeting 
in mid July the members of the Minsk Group discussed Armenian capture of 
Agdam and condemned this act. 
Another meeting of the Minsk Group was scheduled to begin on 30 
August. Yet, this meeting was postponed due to the referendum in Azerbaijan 
which would be held on 29 August. Hence the meeting began in Moscow on 9 
September in order to discuss the implementation of the peace plan. In late 
September another session of the OSCE meeting took place to discuss the matter. 
In early October Armenia accepted the OSCE timetable for the settlement of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict but Azerbaijan rejected it since the plan excluded the 
withdrawal of Armenian forces from the Lachin corridor that was occupied in 
1992 and the return of Azerbaijani refugees to their homes. Azerbaijan insisted 
that Armenian withdrawal from all occupied territory was a precondition for the 
convening of the Minsk Conference. Consequently, "OSCE chief negotiator 
Mario Rafaelli has written to the United Nations Security Council suggesting the 
adoption of a new resolution on Nagorno-Karabakh calling for withdrawal from 
all recently and the newly occupied territories and for a more detailed 
timetable." 15 
The OSCE chairman Margaretha af U gglas visited the area in October and 
commented that the parties were not interested in serious negotiations. 
Nevertheless, another round of OSCE sponsored talks on Karabakh began in 
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Vienna on 2 November but the parties did not reach an agreement at the end of 
the meeting. During this time both Armenia and Azerbaijan complained about the 
inefficiency of the OSCE Minsk Group. Both sides expressed their dissatisfaction 
following the meeting of OSCE foreign ministers in late November and took new 
offensives with intense fighting. 
During the winter of 1993-1994 the OSCE Minsk Group's mediation 
efforts were overshadowed by Russian a mediation attempt which was separate 
from those within the OSCE framework. The Russian mediator for N agorno-
Karabakh, Vladimir Kazimirov and the Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev 
started a new process and contacted officials in Azerbaijan, Armenia and 
N agorno-Karabakh for the acceptance of the Russian peace proposal. 
In February and March the newly appointed chairman of the Minsk Group 
Jan Eliasson also travelled to Baku, Erevan, Moscow and Ankara for talks on a 
possible peace settlement. Eliasson also intended to persuade Russia to 
coordinate its Karabakh diplomacy with the Minsk Group. Subsequently, a 
OSCE delegation headed by the Minsk Group deputy chairman Mathias Mosberg 
travelled to Armenia and Azerbaijan in late April, for talks that focused on 
working out how to reinforce a ceasefire and on coordinating the OSCE and 
Russian mediation efforts. A week later Jan Eliasson also visited the conflict 
area. However, he first went to "Moscow to talk with Russian Foreign Minister 
Andrei Kozyrev who then told that the existence of two parallel mediation efforts 
was a mutual contribution." 16 He did not accept that a competition existed 
between Russia and the OSCE regarding the settlement of the dispute. 
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The most significant difference between the Russian and the OSCE peace 
proposals is the composition of the eventual observer and peacekeeping forces. 
The Russian plan envisaged an international observer force whether within the 
CIS framework, or the CIS in cooperation with the OSCE, in conjunction with a 
Russian peacekeeping force. The OSCE, on the other hand intends to arrange an 
international peacekeeping force. Consequently, by June 1994 no agreement was 
reached on any peace proposal. However, the Russian brokered ceasefire in late 
spring this year continued without any major violations, and, in the Budapest 
summit of the OSCE, at the beginning of December 1994 it was decided that an 
international peace-keeping force should be sent. 
arrangements are still to be made. 
Yet, further details and 
As the chronological background to the Nagorno-Karabakh case is 
completed, the next chapter will analyse the OSCE mediation efforts in this case. 
The analysis is based on the theoretical framework outlined in the second chapter. 
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CHAPTER V: ANALYSIS OF THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CASE 
5.1. The Nature of the Parties: 
Types of conflicting parties. The case of Nagorno-Karabakh lacks parties 
with well-defined identities. Although Armenia and Azerbaijan are 
internationally recognized states, the involvement of Nagorno-Karabakh 
Armenians with their self-declared republic to the dispute complicates the matter. 
The problem is apparent in attempts by the OSCE in bringing the nonstate party 
into the negotiation process. 
The problem first occurred after the decision of a peace conference at 
Minsk. It was then decided to invite the representatives from Nagorno-Karabakh 
as a related party to the dispute after the chairman's consultations with other 
participant countries. Another part of the decision had envisaged direct 
negotiations for a ceasefire between Armenia, Azerbaijan and a delegation from 
Nagorno-Karabakh. Thus a tri-partite negotiation was supposed to result in a 
permanent ceasefire and would be parallel to the OSCE peace conference. 
However, Azerbaijan refused to negotiate with Armenians and officials from 
Nagorno-Karabakh in a tri-partite negotiation on the grounds that it would be 
against Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry 
announced that Azerbaijan preferred the resolution of the conflict through bi-
lateral negotiations with Armenia. 1 
The representation problem prevented the OSCE from getting any positive 
results in the first meetings because these were dominated by the issue of the 
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official representation of Nagorno-Karabakh. For example, when the Rome 
commission on Karabakh (set up under the March 1992 decision of the OSCE) 
met in June 1992, "N agorno-Karabakh leaders boycotted the meeting of the 
Rome commission having been invited to attend as observers. "2 Although they 
later reversed this decision and attended the next sessions, the meetings did not 
produce a positive outcome and talks collapsed in mid-September. 
While no OSCE meeting was taking place, Armenian parliamentarians 
sent a message to Azerbaijani leadership to start direct negotiations for the 
resolution of the Nagomo-Karabakh conflict. At first sight, this was an 
improvement as Armenia accepted to negotiate for the resolution of the conflict 
without Nagomo-Karabakh presence. But it turned out that, this was not the case 
because Azerbaijan's rejection of Nagorno-Karabakh as a negotiating partner 
provided the Armenian side with a tool to reject the proposed peace proposals. 
Armenia continued to argue on every occasion that Karabakh Armenians should 
be at the negotiation table and speak for themselves. They insist that they are not 
a direct party to the dispute, they only represent Nagorno-Karabakh. Several 
peace proposals approved by both Armenia and Azerbaijan could not be 
implemented because the self-declared Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh did not 
approve them. Furthermore, Armenia refused to put pressure on Nagorno-
Karabakh Armenians to accept the proposals. 
As the leadership in Azerbaijan changed, Haydar Aliyev accepted to 
negotiate directly with Nagomo-Karabakh Armenians and argued this would not 
be against the interests and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. However, this 
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change in Azerbaijan's attitude can not be attributed to the OSCE efforts. OSCE 
was unable to convince the former president of Azerbaijan, Elchibey, to negotiate 
with Armenians of Nagomo-Karabakh. He had only accepted the possibility of 
Nagomo-Karabakh officials in the meetings with the signing of a "Courtesy 
Agreement"3 but had to leave office before the decision could be implemented. 
Consequently, rather a change in the Azerbaijani leadership than OSCE efforts 
was a cause of the new Azerbaijani position. 
OSCE was also ineffective due to insistence of Nagorno-Karabakh 
Armenians on their demand for international recognition. This demand is in 
direct contradiction with the OSCE principle that member states recognize the 
inviolability of each other's frontiers. Hence, OSCE could neither urge 
Azerbaijan to negotiate Nagorno-Karabakh nor could it persuade Armenians to 
soften their position. Regarding Aliyev's attitude, it was due to convincing 
efforts of Russia's special mediator Vladimir Kazimirov who had initiated 
attempts at resolving the conflict independent of the OSCE, and, it helped to more 
clearly define the conflicting parties. In conclusion, the type of the parties has 
affected the OSCE mediation efforts and played a partial role in its failure 
resolving the N agorno- Karabakh conflict. 
Previous Relationship. The history of relations between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan is a troubled one. Tensions between the two predate the dispute on 
N agomo-Karabakh. They started following Armenian migration to 
Transcaucasia after Russia's wars with Turkey and Persia. The first major 
Armenian Azerbaijani conflict occurred on 6 February 1905 when a muslim was 
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killed by Dashnaks; a powerful nationalist group in Armenia, in the ethnically 
mixed city of Baku. The fights lasted for three days spreading to other cities as 
well. "Here cultural, religious differences were exacerbated by the animosity of 
local Azerbaijanis, who were largely of peasant background, toward the more 
affluent, urbanized Armenians."4 Moreover, the attempts of the Russian tsarist 
administration to exploit Armenian Azerbaijani hostility played a role since the 
Christian Armenians were favored over the Muslim Azerbaijanis by the Christian 
tsarist regime of the nineteenth century. 
During the First World War, Armenia and Azerbaijan briefly achieved 
independence. However, the complex demography of Transcaucasia made it 
impossible to create ethnically homogeneous states. The focus of the Armenian 
Azerbaijani conflict then shifted from Baku to Nagorno-Karabakh where at the 
time Armenians formed the 90% of the population. Many of them had come to 
the area in the nineteenth century as immigrants from Turkey and Iran.s 
The Bolshevik takeover of Azerbaijan in 1919-1920 led to a renewal of 
violence. "The decision of the Bolshevik regional bureau in Transcaucasus in 
1923 to allocate the (majority Armenian) Karabakh, with its status of autonomous 
region to Azerbaijan, was the starting point for today's territorial dispute between 
the two countries. "6 Armenian attempts to change the status of Nagorno-
Karabakh started in 1930s. Various petitions and appeals demanding the transfer 
of this area were made in 1960s and 1970s but were refused by Moscow. 7 
There are also other reasons for the Azerbaijani Armenian animosity. 
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Soviet authorities, like the tsarist regime, continued to manipulate the Azerbaijani 
Armenian hostility. "The Azerbaijanis have long considered the Armenians in 
their midst to be 'collaborators' with Moscow and a group which enjoyed a 
disproportionate measure of influence in Azerbaijan. "8 Likewise, Armenians also 
have antipathy toward Azerbaijanis due to the "Armenian genocide" by the 
Ottoman Turks in 1915 which is an Armenian claim. 
The short review of the previous relationship between the conflicting sides 
indicate that their history is dominated by conflict rather than cooperation. The 
effect of their previous relationship on the mediation attempts by the OSCE can 
be observed from their approach to the current dispute on Nagomo-Karabakh. 
Their attitude is not based on mutual understanding and benefit. Concludingly, 
the history of their relationship has negatively affected the OSCE mediation. 
Next, one has to look at the degree of economic interdependence between 
the two countries as well as the Nagomo-Karabakh region. One can argue that 
Azerbaijan and Armenia were economically interdependent within the Soviet 
economic structure and now they require economic cooperation in their transition 
to the market economy. However, contrary to the arguments in the literature, this 
does not lead them to act more cooperatively in their conflict over Nagomo-
Karabakh. 
The geographic location of these two countries make their economies 
interdependent to a certain degree. Especially Armenia's dependence is more 
apparent as it is a landlocked country. The effect of economic interdependence is 
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such that the embargo imposed on Armenia by Azerbaijan severely damaged the 
Armenian economy, the country having electricity and food shortages. 
As a result, the economic interdependence does not lead to a more 
cooperative approach to the conflict. On the contrary, both countries' economies 
are indexed on war and the conflict has intensified although they are members of 
the CIS. As a result, economic interdependence does not lead to the success of 
the mediation attempt because the parties do not consider it a reason for a more 
cooperative attitude. 
Personality Conflict Looking at all sides' statements in the press is an 
indicator of the presence of a personality conflict. For example, when the conflict 
has started, Ayaz Muttalibov was the Azerbaijani president and the Armenian 
president was Levon Ter Petrosyan. Neither has made a statement indicating a 
personality conflict between them. After Muttalibov's powers were transferred to 
Yakup Memedov who became the acting president in Azerbaijan, he met 
Petrosyan in Tehran for talks on a ceasefire agreement. Both talked 
constructively and one can observe that there was no personal dislike between the 
two that would, for example, prevent them from meeting. 
Abulfaz Elchibey was elected president of Azerbaijan on 16 June 1992. 
Again there was no personal dislike between him and Levon Ter Petrosyan which 
would hinder negotiations. In fact, at a time when no OSCE meeting took place 
because of Armenian offensives in April 1993, two presidents met in Ankara at 
Turkish president Turgut Ozal's funeral. After the ceremony at Kocatepe 
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Mosque, Petrosyan invited Elchibey to visit him at his hotel which resulted in a 
twenty-five minute tete-a-tete.9 Following the meeting, Elchibey said that 
informal peace negotiations would resume under the auspices of the OSCE. 
This meeting has contributed to mediation efforts since Azerbaijan had 
previously withdrawn from OSCE sponsored talks due to the Armenian offensive 
on April 6. 10 The leaders also intended to establish a direct telephone link 
between them. After a short time the leadership in Azerbaijan changed once 
again. Owing to a rebellion initiated by Suret Huseinov, Elchibey left Baku and 
Haydar Aliyev took over his powers. After coming to power, Aliyev stated that 
this personal relations with Petrosyan could contribute to the resolution of the 
conflict between his country and Armenia. 11 Petrosyan had also made a similar 
statement. 12 
The relations between the Azerbaijani and Nagorno-Karabakh leaders 
were not influenced by a particular personal dislike either. The fact that 
Azerbaijani leaders refused to negotiate directly with Nagorno-Karabakh 
Armenians did not stem from a personality conflict. Azerbaijani leaders argued 
that they would not recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent state and that 
direct talks with the Nagorno-Karabakh would be against Azerbaijan's territorial 
integrity. Haydar Aliyev on the other hand decided to initiate direct talks and did 
not view this as against Azerbaijan's interests. The observation indicated no 
personality conflict between confronting sides that might influence mediation 
attempts negatively. Its lack did not cause mediation success either. 
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Re~ime Type. Armenia and Azerbaijan are newly independent states. 
They were part of the Russian empire since the early nineteenth century and then 
they were republics of the USSR. Their transition to democracy is not yet 
completed. They are inexperienced in democratic institutions and procedures. 
The lack of democracy affects their attitude in the conflict over Nagomo-
Karabakh, and consequently, the mediation process. 
First of all, the political culture of local leaderships influences their 
perception of the conflict. They are convinced that "historical evidence rather 
than international law is the ultimate argument in determining which nations' 
claims to a given territory are valid." 13 They also fail "to comprehend that there 
are various intermediate stages between total subservience and total independence 
(such as degrees of autonomy, federal, confederal agreements). This in tum 
engenders an 'all or nothing' approach to negotiations." 14 
With the absence of well-structured democratic institutions and an 
understanding of democracy, both sides are politically immature. Their 
understanding of each other hinders a solution through mutual agreement. They 
prefer to treat mediation as a tool for gaining time. On the one hand, by accepting 
mediation, they seem to be parties eager to resolve their conflict by peaceful 
means. Yet, on the other hand, they reject suggestions and proposals when they 
perceive it as a threat to their national interests and continue fighting to "secure" 
them. Owing to their zero-sum mentality mediation attempts fail to bring about a 
negotiated settlement. 
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As to the relationship between inner unity and mediation success, we 
observe that in Azerbaijan and Armenia there are powerful opposition groups 
which resist the idea of resolving the conflict with territorial concessions, they 
instead advocate fighting to oppose occupation. This is especially apparent in 
changes of Azerbaijani leadership; Abulfaz Elchibey's replacement of Ayaz 
Muttalibov and Elchibey's replacement by Haydar Aliyev have mainly originated 
from military defeats suffered against Armenians. This represents a strong 
preference for an armed solution in the political environment surrounding 
Azerbaijani leaders. The same can also be asserted for Levon Ter Petrosyan who 
also has to convince opposition groups not very sympathetic towards peace 
attempts that would require a return to the old status quo. 
To further clarify the effect of inner unity, we have to provide a more 
detailed analysis. After its declaration of independence, the Azerbaijani 
parliament abolished Nagorno-Karabakh's autonomous status. The reason for this 
was that the Armenians shot down a helicopter. But after the meeting in Moscow 
between Levon Ter Petrosyan and Ayaz Muttalibov, the Azerbaijani president at 
that time, the autonomous status of Nagomo-Karabakh was reestablished. During 
this time Muttalibov was under pressure from the opposition as he was perceived 
as an old communist by the democratic groups in Baku. The opposition groups 
were pressing for the establishment of Azerbaijan's national army and wanted a 
mobilization in the country. They also protested the restitution of Nagomo-
Karabakh's status. 
Levon Ter Petrosyan too was under pressure emanating especially from 
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the Dashnakstityun party in Erevan which advocated Nagorno-Karabakh's 
independence. As contrasted to Petrosyan and Muttalibov's declaration that "the 
meeting was a good basis on which to start negotiations," the Russian television's 
comment on the Moscow meeting was: "the real force behind the continued 
violence was powerful nationalist movements in both countries." It stated that the 
meeting between the leaders would hardly have any political consequences 
although Muttalibov and Petrosyan might be ready for compromise. 15 
The nationalist groups in both countries, the Azerbaijani Popular Front 
and the Dashnaks in Armenia used the Nagorno-Karabakh issue to oppose 
governments. The events in Nagorno-Karabakh were seen as a honoring 
obligation, people were attached emotionally to the issue and its loss would mean 
a failure for the whole country. Such a domestic environment did not enable the 
leaders to approach the conflict in a compromising way. In fact, the military 
defeats in Nagorno-Karabakh led twice to a change in government in Baku. 
Power Disparity. In order to analyze power disparity we will look at the 
military powers of the parties including Karabakh for a comparison and the 
willingness of the parties to fight. The assets of the Russian Trans-Caucasus 
military have been redistributed but considerable amounts of Russian military 
equipment and servicemen remain in the area. In April 1993, the Russian 
Defence Ministry announced that the seventh army was dissolved and that this 
army was not located in Armenia. It is impossible to assert whether large portions 
of this military equipment and even men are converted into Armenian fighting 
power. 
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However, it is well known that the conflict in N agorno-Karabakh led to 
the creation of informal military units in Armenia. The most influential one was 
the Armenian National Army. By 1990, the Soviets had banned these groups and 
claimed that it had 140.000 men. In February 1992, the Armenian government 
requested that Armenian officers serving in the Soviet army should return to 
Armenia and command the national forces. In October 1992, the president 
decreed the call-up of first category reserve officers. But there was a problem: 
these were not well trained. Thus this initiative was unsatisfactory. 
Although theArmenian army is poorer than the Azerbaijani army 
(Azerbaijan has greater manpower in its armed forces and reserves of ammunition 
and armaments), the "defense forces" in Karabakh are excellent. Volunteers 
from Armenia and mercenaries who are former Soviet army officers are very well 
equipped with Kaleshnikovs, artillery, tanks, armored vehicles, missiles including 
GRAD missile launchers. This strengthens Armenian military power. Therefore, 
we can argue that Armenia was more powerful at the beginning of the conflict. 
The Armenian Diaspora helped Armenians (and of course they still do so), and, as 
a result, they were able to take over one fifth of the Azerbaijani territory. 
Azerbaijan has later managed to stand against Armenia with some support of 
Afghan mudjahiddins and military training by Turkish officers. 
Because the parties' power match each other they were able to fight for so 
long. Furthermore, their willingness to fight affected their positions. Their 
positions became polarized as they fought for sometime now and issued 
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statements regarding their determination to fight and readiness all along the 
military clashes. Now they have reached a point of exhaustion as their economies 
are badly hurt by the war and the internal stability became very shaky. This 
explains why the last ceasefire has been respected by both sides for seven months. 
To develop this point further we have to recall that we have two 
competing hypotheses about the effect of power disparity over the success of 
mediation efforts by a third party: one stipulates an equality and the other an 
inequality of power to have a greater chance of mediation success. The empirical 
evidence suggests that now both Azerbaijan and Nagomo-Karabakh Armenians, 
Armenia being their ally, are at roughly an equal footing that suggests the 
mediation success is actually more likely. 
Deutsch and Frei's hypothesis is not valid for the Nagomo-Karabakh case 
due to the Azerbaijani willingness to fight when they were losing their territory 
and their military weakness did not result in any concessions. We could observe 
even when their powers were not equal their positions were polarized and they 
were eager to fight to win at all costs. In the later period of the conflict the two 
sides became roughly equal; fighting was still intense. Then, it could be 
observed, together with the rising cost of the conflict that the two sides were close 
to a stalemate. 
No side could win on its own, and, despite outside help they received the 
cost of the conflict became unbearable. This explains why the latest ceasefire is 
respected for almost eight months. The chance of a political settlement is higher 
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now, when the power of the parties match each other and when they fought 
enough feeling the cost of the conflict which ·has also deteriorated their 
willingness to fight. 
5.2. The Nature of the Dispute: 
Issues. Theoreticians agree that territorial disputes, sovereignty, and 
independence issues are less amenable to mediation. The case under study is a 
territorial conflict over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh including the region's 
independence. By the issues at stake, this conflict is in the category where 
mediation attempts have little chance. 
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a national obligation for Armenians and 
Azerbaijanis. "Both ... have the full weight of ethnic emotion invested in the 
issue." 16 As they are independent, their national aspirations are no more stifled 
and both Armenians and Azerbaijanis put more value in the issue. As Paul Goble 
notes, "for the Armenians involved, Karabakh represents the last significant 
territory, aside from Soviet-defined Armenia, to which they have historic ties. 
For them Karabakh is a location invested with the meaning of an ethnic last 
stand." 17 Karabakh has also strong cultural significance to the Azerbaijanis. For 
them, the loss of the territory of Nagomo-Karabakh would be an affront to their 
sovereignty and a capitulation to the Armenians who once were a minority in 
Baku.ls Accordingly, Azerbaijanis claim that their territorial sovereignty should 
be respected. They refuse a transfer of territory to Armenians and offer a degree 
of autonomy to Nagomo-Karabakh. On the contrary, claiming that they have 
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formed the majority of Nagorno-Karabakh's population, and have been neglected 
by the Azerbaijani leaderships that caused the economic backwardness of the area, 
Armenians demand independence and recognition because they have a right for 
self-determination. 
Statements made by government officials also indicate the importance 
attached to the issues. For example, Vafa Gulizade, an adviser to Haydar Aliyev 
had told that Azerbaijan's position was clear: "We must liberate our territories, 
and we are not going to agree to any Russian proposal that freezes the current 
frontline." 19 Looking at a statement by the former Defense Minister of 
Azerbaijan during Ayaz Muttalibov's presidency one can not see any change in 
Azerbaijan's handling of the issues. He has also told that Azerbaijan would not 
leave a piece of territory and would establish its own army to liberate Nagorno-
Karabakh. 20 The issues keep their significance for Armenians as well. Armenia 
declares that it does not have any territorial claims on Azerbaijani territory yet it 
continues its claim on the rights of self-determination of Nagorno-Karabakh 
Armenians. The parties' perception of issues is a key factor for mediation 
success, and, in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, the nature of the issues played a 
role in the failure of OSCE mediation. Owing to the issues the parties act with a 
zero-sum mentality and this makes the mediation of the conflict difficult. 
Intensity. It was in February 1988 when the conflict claimed its first 
deaths. Two Azerbaijanis were shot by armed Armenian forces in Nagorno-
Karabakh during a protest march by Azerbaijanis from Agdam to the enclave. 
The withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the depopulated villages of Nagorno-
Karabakh after the failed August Coup in Moscow in 1991, increased the clashes 
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between the two hostile groups. During this time, Kazakhstan and Russia 
attempted to broker a ceasefire but it failed to take effect. The death toll since 
February 1988 was estimated to have risen to 1,300 by the end of January 1991, 
meaning the dispute had become an intense one. By 1992 the conflict had 
claimed 2,000 lives. 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 made the 
military situation worse as the conflict grew from a series of skirmishes between 
rival villages into a sophisticated modern war, involving tanks, artillery, heat-
seeking missiles, and aircraft. The OSCE mediation attempt just followed these 
events at the beginning of 1992. The OSCE following Armenia and Azerbaijan's 
independence had sent a observer team to these countries which visited Nagorno-
Karabakh as well. The OSCE reports "urged an immediate ceasefire, the creation 
of a commission on refugees and an embargo on arms sales to both sides of the 
conflict."21 In the meantime the fightings continued to escalate and the Armenian 
forces captured the Azeri stronghold of Khojali on February 25-26 and massacred 
people. According to Western sources, 300-450 people were killed. 
The OSCE took up the issue during the Prague meeting of Committee of 
Senior Officials on February 28. The decision taken at the end of this meeting 
encouraged mediation efforts by Russia and Kazakhstan. However, the OSCE 
mediation efforts to hold an international conference following a ceasefire 
agreement was decided at the Helsinki follow-up meeting on 13-14 March 1992. 
Thus, the OSCE mediation was initiated when the conflict had already become an 
intense one. The OSCE failed to broker a ceasefire agreement as parties' 
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positions were already too polarized. OSCE mediation was ill-timed since the 
conflict had passed the point at which its intensity would make mediation more 
productive and also the fatalities were beyond the number that parties could stop 
fighting to cut their losses. Their positions were so hardened that they were 
determined to fight. 
It would be appropriate if OSCE could intervene at the end of 1991 just 
before the conflict intensified and became a conventional war. However, at that 
time Armenia and Azerbaijan had not yet become members to the OSCE. 
Therefore, the ill-timing should not be attributed to the OSCE but to the natural 
flow of events. The intensity factor is also important for the analysis of the time 
factor. 
Time factor. We can analyze the timing of the OSCE involvement in the 
mediation process according to the duration of the conflict and the ripeness of the 
moment. The latest conflict had started in 1988 when Armenia and Azerbaijan 
were still part of the Soviet Union and also when the OSCE had not yet taken up 
its new role in conflict management. Following both states' independence and 
their joining the OSCE, the OSCE took up the Nagomo-Karabakh conflict on its 
agenda. By that time the conflict was three years old and it turned to a 
conventional war. 
From the point of the duration of the conflict this can be considered as a 
late involvement, more than thirty-six months had passed before the beginning of 
OSCE mediation. However, one must also mention that several attempts took 
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place prior to the OSCE mediation efforts. These were ill-timed too, since they 
had started after the conflict began to escalate and parties' positions hardened. 
They rather preferred to fight than to give concessions. As in the factor of 
intensity, the reason for OSCE's late intervention was not controllable by itself 
because the conflict started much before the OSCE's reorientation. 
Ripeness The analysis made above indicates that the duration and the 
intensity of the conflict are not so helpful in finding out which moment was 
appropriate for OSCE's involvement. · However they can be combined with the 
concept of ripeness to provide a better guide for the right timing of involvement. 
In order to do this we first have to look at the international context to analyse the 
factor of ripeness. 
The resumption and the intensification of the Nagomo-Karabakh conflict 
followed the end of the cold war and the breakup of the Soviet Union that opened 
a period dominated by conflict. The bipolar system is replaced by another one 
where territorial borders are increasingly being questioned as many of them do 
not match with the ethnic composition of countries. Consequently, nationalism 
and irredentism have reemerged and the principle of self-determination plays a 
central role in international politics. 
Now we have to ask the following question: based on these systemic 
developments was the time ripe for the OSCE intervention in the conflict? 
According to Kriesberg, the ripe moment is the time when the conflictive parties 
are ready to move from escalation to de-escalation. However, when the OSCE 
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mediation has started, the parties were escalating the conflict, the domestic 
pressures were in that direction, and national sentiments were strongly attached to 
the issue all this being underlined by the global political transformation. 
Furthermore this is an age-old conflict between Armenians and Azerbaijanis and 
the international context did not provide well-established mechanisms to resolve 
these disputes. In addition, Russian, Turkish, and Iranian interests in the region 
complicated the conflict. Thus, given these conditions and Kriesberg's definition 
of a ripe moment, the parties were not ready to move away from escalation to de-
escalation. In other words, the time was not ripe for the success of the OSCE 
mediation. 
If we analyse the situation according to Haass' point, again we conclude 
that the situation was not ripe for a third-party intervention. Firstly, there was not 
a shared perception of the desirability of an agreement even if the leaders declared 
that they wanted to start negotiations at once. The sides were rigid in their 
positions and wanted an agreement strictly based on their interests. Nagorno-
Karabakh Armenians have made this clear by declaring themselves independent 
of Azerbaijan and they did not want anything less. Azerbaijan on the other hand 
did not allow the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians to secede. The common ground 
for negotiations was not established as each party perceived it as a way to come 
up with its own solution. Secondly, political leaders were not strong enough to 
permit compromises as the issue was seen as a honoring obligation, and the 
leaders' success was measured according to their gains in the dispute. The 
opposition groups were rigid as well. The leaders' weakness could not lead to a 
compromise as this would mean a change in the government and leadership. 
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Moreover the ceasefire proposals, except the last one realized by the 
Russian initiative, were rejected by one party or the other on the basis that their 
interests were not secured. No one can give a guarantee for the last ceasefire 
either. However, one can argue that a mutually acceptable process exists as it is 
agreed that a peace conference should follow a permanent ceasefire. 
Zartman on the other hand argued that a deadlock is the prior condition for 
ripeness. Yet no deadlock was reached at the time of OSCE's intervention. As 
the conflict escalated and fighting continued, the parties could obtain marginal 
victories but no side has the military capability to win on their own. Some 
outside help such as the Afghan mujahiddins and Russian mercenaries can make 
either side to be able to obtain these marginal victories. A strict deadlock would 
leave both sides with no marginal gains at all. However, since a ceasefire is in 
effect for nearly eight months, we can argue that neither side has an interest in 
restarting the fighting. We can further assume that the parties are now in a 
hurting stalemate. If we take into consideration the initiation of the OSCE 
mediation in 1992, we can conclude that the time was not ripe. To return to the 
current situation there is no deadline imposing pressure on both parties. The 
current oil pipeline discussions are not attractive enough to facilitate 
negotiations.22 Finally there are no terms of settlement they consider worth 
giving any concessions. Therefore, the ripeness condition is partially satisfied. 
5.3. The Nature of the Mediator 
The identity of the OSCE itself was a major discussion from 1988 
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onwards. At the beginning, it was a forum for dialogue, negotiation, and 
cooperation but it gradually became institutionalized since 1990. In Helsinki, in 
July 1992, the OSCE was announced to be a regional organization acting under 
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Thus an international organization, namely the 
OSCE is the mediator in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict whose efforts are examined 
in this study. The last Budapest summit indicated that the OSCE finally reached 
the end of its institutionalization process becoming OSCE. 
Characteristics According to the theoretical framework outlined in the 
second chapter, one of the characteristics of a mediator is its neutrality. Since the 
OSCE has no direct interest in the conflict, it is called a neutral mediator. The 
crucial feature of the OSCE is that it is an international organization formed by 
independent states that have their own interests. It is difficult to talk about the 
interests of an international organization oo se with respect to an issue excluding 
the major members from it. A policy emanating from the organization will be a 
product of some internal bargaining process comprising many member states. 
Hence, the neutrality of this organization must further be qualified given that it is 
not an individual or a single state mediator. 
Once the mediation efforts_ of the OSCE had begun, both Armenia and 
Azerbaijan made several statements regarding OSCE's neutrality. At first, both 
perceived OSCE as neutral; as no agreement was reached by the end of 1993, 
both questioned OSCE's neutrality. At the meeting of OSCE Foreign Ministers in 
Rome in November 1993, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Hasan Hasanov criticized 
the involvement of the Minsk Group. He accused the participants of siding with 
53 
Armenia and of putting pressure on Azerbaijan to make "unacceptable" 
concessions.23 Armenia also complained that the OSCE was ineffective. The 
Azerbaijani and Armenian perceptions hence play an important role in the 
assessment of OSCE's neutrality. In general, one can argue that the OSCE is 
neutral by looking at decisions taken by the OSCE but the presence of Turkey and 
Russia in the Minsk Group make its neutrality questionable filtered through the 
disputants' perceptions. 
Impartiality means that the mediator has no direct bias against the views of 
a party or preferences favoring one over the other disputant, in other words, 
impartiality refers to the condition of even-handedness. The impartiality is to 
some extent influenced by the history of relations between the mediator and the 
disputants. Therefore, one has to explain the history of relations among OSCE, 
Armenia, and Azerbaijan. The relations between OSCE, Azerbaijan, and 
Armenia started at the beginning of 1992 with the two countries' membership but 
this is a very short period to evaluate the impartiality of the OSCE. 
The knowledge and the skill of the OSCE to deal with conflicts like the 
one over Nagorno-Karabakh is insufficient. Indeed, it is the first case which the 
OSCE decided to mediate. Besides, it does not have the technical skill and the 
experience in dealing with conflicts like this one. Although the OSCE has 
physical resources, and it is internationally supported, it lacks leverage because it 
lacks the endorsement mechanism to exert pressure on the parties. 
Although Princen argues that a neutral mediator can become more like a 
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principal as it gets more information, this in return endangers the mediator's 
acceptability. In the Nagorno-Karabakh case, Russia's, Turkey's, and Iran's 
mediation attempts were unsuccessful and they were regarded as impartial by one 
party or the other. Hence, the expectation that the OSCE would be impartial and 
neutral has attracted the parties for its mediation. 
Princen has also argued that a combination of neutral and principal 
mediators would be most effective. In the Nagomo-Karabakh case, Russia 
continued its mediation efforts outside the OSCE framework as well. It is a 
country capable of putting pressure on the disputants. At a time when OSCE 
initiatives were stalled, Russian Foreign Minister persuaded Azerbaijani President 
to talk directly with Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. Despite this development, 
Azerbaijan refuses mediation attempts made only by Russia and wants the 
negotiations to be continued within the OSCE framework. Armenia has also 
recently announced a similar view. Both countries want to avoid pressure, a 
forced settlement. Russia's individual involvement outside the OSCE 
overshadows mediation attempts in general. Therefore, the recent decision taken 
at the Budapest summit envisaging a mediation only through the OSCE will 
clarify the bases for a mutually acceptable formula thus increasing the chance of 
successful mediation. 
Zartman and Touval argue that leverage is more important in mediation 
than impartiality. This may be true when a settlement can be imposed through 
carrot and stick tactics of a mediator. However this is not the case in Nagorno-
Karabakh. The parties prefer impartial mediators as they can protect their 
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interests. 
Role The Mediator's communication strategies include to make contact 
with the parties, to arrange for their interactions, to supply missing information, 
and to allow that parties' interests are discussed with no exception. OSCE by its 
purpose is a forum for negotiation thus it arranged for the interactions. The OSCE 
Minsk Group was mainly formed for this purpose: it contacted the parties to bring 
them together and arranged for meetings. 
The Minsk Group also worked for the presence of Nagorno-Karabakh 
Armenians in the meetings as a related party to allow all parties to speak for their 
interests. However, as Azerbaijan denied any recognition and direct negotiation 
with the Nagomo-Karabakh, they could participate in the meetings only with 
some representatives as a related party. Similarly, there is also the question of the 
representation of Nagorno-Karabakh Azerbaijanis in the process. As they have 
been absent in the meetings until now, the OSCE had partial success in 
establishing a link between the conflicting sides. 
In another communicator role, the OSCE gathered information on 
perceptions, and opinions of all sides. OSCE has also sent fact-finding missions, 
and successive OSCE Minsk Group chairmen visited the area to obtain the 
missing information and to contact conflicting sides. We can therefore conclude 
that the OSCE performed its principal role as a communicator. 
The more active strategy of formulation requires a mediator to choose 
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meeting sites, control pace, end formality of the meetings, establish protocol, 
suggest procedures, control timing, deal with simple issues first, and keep the 
parties at the table. The OSCE decided who the participants would be, chose 
meeting sites and controlled the formality of the meetings. For example, it 
decided that there would be informal sessions of the OSCE Minsk Group before 
the final meeting. Although the OSCE was unable to find a political settlement 
acceptable to all sides, the parties agreed that an international peace-keeping force 
should be located. However there is a disagreement on the details of this 
arrangement too. So we cannot argue that the OSCE was successful in its role of 
formulator. 
In general, a reason for why the OSCE had only partially performed its 
role of manipulator is that it lacks leverage. It can not exert pressure on parties 
as it is equipped with no mechanism of endorsement. The OSCE can not side 
with one party to form a coalition as it will endanger its neutrality and 
impartiality. This can in return endanger the mediation efforts in general. 
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CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION 
In general, our analysis implies that a successful mediation of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict largely depends on factors which are beyond the 
control of the OSCE. The OSCE cannot urge Azerbaijan to negotiate directly 
with the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh. The Azerbaijani acceptance of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh as a negotiator is a result of the change in the Azerbaijani 
leadership; it cannot be attributed to the efforts by the organization. 
Even m,ore important than this, an acceptance of the Nagomo-Karabakh as 
a member would transgress the organization's principle of the inviolability of 
members' frontiers. Hence, the OSCE has no influence on a factor argued to 
decrease the likelihood of a successful mediation: a principal party to the conflict 
lacks a well-defined identity. 
The same consideration holds also for the factors of previous relationship, 
the personality conflict, regime type, power disparity, and the nature of the issue. 
Only the factor of intensity might be argued to be open to a positive influence by 
the OSCE as its involvement could take place prior to the polarization of fighting 
parties. However, the OSCE could do nothing because Azerbaijan and Armenia 
became members well after their positions hardened. 
Of course the factors outlined in the identity and the role of the mediators 
would provide the OSCE some opportunities but it is not easy to arrive at 
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optimistic assessments. It is for the first time involved in the mediation of a 
conflict, hence it does not possess sufficient knowledge and skill in such an 
enterprise. Moreover it lacks the mechanisms of endorsement to manipulate the 
issue. Thus it cannot fulfill its role of a manipulator successfully. Another 
negative factor is that its neutrality is subject to influences from both Russia and 
Turkey members of the Minsk Group. The bargaining between such members 
whose interests are directly at stake in the conflict will largely determine the 
attitude of the organization. 
Nevertheless the OSCE is successful as a communicator. The channels are 
open and probably all parties' interests will be spoken out. The OSCE is partially 
successful as a formulator. It is only beginning in search of an acceptable 
formula. A draft is actually prepared by the Russian and the Swedish co-
presidents. It is a detailed political solution that will serve to assess disputants' 
initial reactions. Thus the OSCE started only very recently its role of 
formulation. We also conclude that the OSCE is incapable as a manipulator.. In 
specific terms, the factors put forward in the literature help construct analyses of 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. They set out the central forces and relations 
that must be searched out in any mediation issue facilitating the elimination of 
unnecessary details. 
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